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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ing into circumstances impossible to be unravelled."5 6  These considera-
tions have no less force today than when they were first announced. They
have resulted in the development of a rule that, when negligence is the
basis of the action, actual proof of negligence will not be required; the
plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing the carrier received the
freight in good condition and delivered it to the destination in damaged
condition.5 7
The underlying reason is that the facts as to the injury or damage are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier.'
It is submitted that this simple rule effectively accomplishes all of the
purposes of the common law rule which remain valid today.
WImLLAm R. BAm
Last Clear Chance in Admiralty
INTRODUCnON
In recent years there appears to be an increasing tendency on the
part of our federal courts to apply the doctrine of last dear chance in
admiralty cases. Although comment has been made that there are few
decisions in which the doctrine has been applied,' this writer has found
that last dear chance has been applied either in name or in principle in
at least 20 cases. It was held in the early part of this century that last
clear chance had no place in admiralty law.2 However, in a number of
instances it has crept into the field and apparently has confused some of
our courts on occasion. Whether or not this creation of the common
law can coexist with fundamental admiralty principles is the subject of
this note. The scope of the discussion is by necessity limited to the
problems of maritime collision law in our federal courts. To facilitate
comparison with the common law and for the convenience of those not
familiar with admiralty terminology, the parties will be listed as plaintiff
and defendant throughout this article rather than libellant and libellee.
56. Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term Rep. (Durnford & East) 27, 33 (1785).
57. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 135 Ohio St. 560, 21 N.E.2d 865 (1939); Sugar
v. National Transit Corp., 82 Ohio App. 439, 81 N.E.2d 609 (1948).
58. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 135 Ohio St. 560, 562, 21 N.B.2d 865, 866(1939). The clarity of the rule in this case has been clouded by a subsequent 4-3
decision of the Supreme Court, which, while expressly approving the former case,
held that "The mere fact that an animal, apparently sound when delivered for ship-
ment, arrives at its destination with a disease is not enough to charge the carrier
with having negligently caused such disease." Grosjean v. Pennsylvania R.R., 146




It seems appropirate at this point to include a capsule outline of mari-
time collision law as it is applied in the United States.
Liability under admiralty collision law is based on fault; 3 i.e., the fail-
ure to observe the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances
of the individual case. As at the common law, fault alone is not suf-
ficient to impose liability. The mariner's breach of duty must be the
proximate cause of an injury resulting in damage.'
The Standard of Care
The standards imposed upon the mariner, in addition to general prin-
ciples of navigation are largely statutory. The Rules of the Road5 coupled
with supplementary federal regulation, plus rules issued by state and local
harbor authorities prescribe specific courses of conduct for most situa-
tions.
The Master who breaches a statutory duty prior to a collision finds a
very heavy legal burden imposed upon him by the Rule of The Pennsyl-
vania.6 In that case the court ruled that a vessel guilty of statutory fault
must prove not only that the fault shown probably did not, but that it
could not have contributed to cause the collision. The rationale of the
Pennsylvania rule is based upon the insistence by the courts that the Rules
of Navigation are to be strictly and literally construed and that compli-
ance is mandatory.7 When the Rule is applied it raises an almost irrebut-
table presumption of causation. However, this stringent approach has
been modified by the courts and the Rules of Navigation authorize a
departure from the normal prescribed course of action in certain situ-
ations.
The primary judicial modification of the Pennsylvania rule is found
in the doctrine of in exfremis.
The admiralty courts recognize that even the "reasonable" man may
make an error in judgment, when, through no fault of his own, he is
1. Richmond v. The Connie C. Cenac and The LaCache, 157 F. Supp. 397 at 400,
n. 8 (E.D. La. 1957).
2. The Norman B. Ream, 252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918).
3. The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1872).
4. Gulf Atlantic Transf. Co. v. Becker County Sand and Gravel Co., 122 F. Supp.
13 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
5. The United States has 4 sets of Rules of Navigation applying to different waters.
For the purpose of this article only the International Rules for Navigation at Sea, 65
Star. 406 (1951), 33 U.S.C. §§ 143-47 (d) (1952), will be considered, as the other
regulations follow the same basic principles.
6. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874).
7. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 698 (1893).
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placed in a position where he must take action to avoid danger. When
two vessels approach each other so closely that collision is inevitable un-
less both vessels take action to prevent it, the vessels are said to be in
extremis.8 Thus, when a vessel, through no fault of her own, becomes
involved in an in ext'emis situation, the courts, in general, exonerate the
vessel for her actions as long as the navigator exercised reasonable judg-
ment, although hindsight may show that he undertook the wrong course
of conduct or violated the Rules of Navigation.9
The Rules of Navigation recognize that the special circumstances of
a situation may require a different course of action from that prescribed
by the Rules in the ordinary situation. 10 However, authorized departure
from the statutory standard is severely limited to a few situations where
it is readily apparent that adherence to the Rules will actually increase the
risk of collision."
Conversely, it should be noted that the specific rules of navigation are
minimum requirements, and the mariner may still be held at fault for
not exercising a greater degree of care than that laid down by these legis-
lative standards.12
Recoverable Damages
Although the factual determination of negligence in admiralty is
similar to the common law process, the resulting liability is a decidedly
different proposition. A court may determine that although a collision
occurred, neither vessel was at fault, in that the master or deck officers
directing the ship's movements exercised reasonable care, or the casualty
may be attributed to an Act of God. This is generally termed inevitable
8. See FARWELL, RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD 326 (rev. ed. 1954).
9. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852); Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co.
v. United States, 175 F.2d 632, 640 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868
(1949).
10. Rule 27, International Rules for Navigation at Sea, 33 U.S.C. 146 (k) (1952),
"In obeying and construing these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of
navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances, including the limitations
of the craft involved, which may render a departure from the above rules necessary
in order to avoid immediate danger."
11. For example, when vessels are entering or leaving a slip, or when more than 2
vessels are approaching each other. For a more complete discussion see FARWELL,
THE RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, ch. 8 (rev. ed. 1954).
12. This is recognized by Rule 29 of the International Rules; "Nothing in these
Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master or crew thereof, from the
consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals or of any neglect to keep a
proper lookout, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the
ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case," 33 U.S.C.




accident and each party bears his own loss.' 3 In some instances the evi-
dence may fail to show a specific breach of duty on the part of either
vessel, although it is apparent from the circumstances that fault to some
degree was present. The courts have classified this situation as one of
inscrutable fault and apply the principle that unless fault is affirmatively
shown each vessel bears it own loss.' 4  When it appears that only one
vessel is dearly at fault, the end result is the same as at common law;
the offending vessel bears the entire loss, both -its own and that of the
innocent ship.' 5
When both vessels are equally at fault, or nearly so, the admiralty rule
of division of damages applies. This is one of the distinguishing features
of liability under admiralty law. The maritime courts early rebelled
against the doctrine of contributory negligence and declared that contribu-
tory fault does not bar an action for damages arising from a collision.1
Instead, the total damages are divided equally.' 7 The divided damages
rules has been criticized as being a harsh rule,'3 but actually the rule is
just if applied in the proper case. The criticism should really be leveled
at the improper use of the principle when the facts do not warrant the
result. When both vessels are at fault, but dearly disproportionately, the
rule of major and minor fault comes into play.' 9 The rule is usually
applied when one vessel is grossly negligent and the other vessel at fault
,only to a minor degree. The minor fault of the relatively innocent ves-
sel is held not to be a contributory cause of the collision and the entire
loss is borne by the vessel whose conduct was clearly -the major cause of
the casualty. The result obtained under this principle mitigates the
13. See The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); Stainback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
532 (1852).
14. The Jumna, 149 Fed. 171 (2d Cir. 1906).
15. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); Oaksmith v. Garner, 205 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1953).
16. See The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, (1890); The Catherine, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
170 (1855).
17. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The Catherine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170
(1855). The result is reached by adding the total damages of both vessels, and
each party bears half of this total. For example, assume vessels A and B collide.
A's damages = $100,000; B's damages = $50,000. Total damages equal $150,000.
B would be required to contribute $25,000 to A to even the loss.
18. Tank Barge Hygrade v. Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1957);
Oriental Trading and Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1949);
Socony Vacuum Transportation Co. v. Gypsum Packet Co., 153 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.
1946).
19. See The Minnie, 100 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1900); The Transfer No. 8, 96 Fed.
253 (2d Cir. 1899). Cf. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896); The Oregon, 158
U.S. 186, 204 (1895); The City of New York, 147 U.S. 71, 85 (1893); Pure Oil
Co. v. Neilson Inc., 135 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. La. 1955), a4'd, 233 F.2d 790 (5th
Cit. 1956).
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harsher aspects of the divided damages rule. It has been criticized as
being a vague and unreliable principle,20 but actually it appears that this
form of comparative fault, while difficult in some instances, to administer,
-is basically a sound and just rule. Here too, it seems that the misapplica-
tion of the rule is more the basis of the criticism than the principle itself.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE AT COMMON LAW
In 1842 the English case of Dazies v. Mann2 gave birth to the doc-
trine of last clear chance. Like Jack's beanstalk this child of the common
law grew out of all natural proportion, and today is accepted by most
American courts in one form or another. The apparent reason for such
ready acceptance by the courts seems to be the judicial distaste for the de-
fense of contributory negligence. The basic philosophy of last clear
chance presupposes that if the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
care had the last opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's prior negli-
gence is not the proximate cause of the result.22
The doctrine is primarily applied in the following situations: (1)
where the plaintiff by reason of his prior negligence is helpless to avoid
the harm and the defendant discovers his peril in time to avoid it by the
exercise of due care. Most courts hold that the plaintiff can recover
under the last clear chance rule either under the theory that the last
wrongdoer is the proximate cause, or by classifying defendant's conduct
as willful or wanton: (2) where the plaintiff is not helpless, but merely
inattentive, and the defendant discovers his inattention and his danger in
time to avoid it. Although the defendant cannot logically be considered
the last wrong doer since the plaintiff is actively negligent up to the time
of the casualty, most courts still allow recovery by the plaintiff by either
classifying defendant's conduct as wanton, or in many instances simply
stating the defendant's action or inaction was the "proximate cause" of
the injury; (3) where the plaintiff is helpless and the defendant, though
he did not discover plaintiff's peril, would in the exercise of due care
have discovered it in time to avoid the harm, a substantial minority of
courts again apply the doctrine and allow recovery by the plaintiff. Al-
though the last wrongdoer philosophy may validly apply here, it is hard
to say that the defendant had a last clear chance, but rather, it would be
more correct to say that the defendant had the last possible opportunity
to avoid the harm. Where both parties are merely inattentive, or where
20. GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 403 (1957).
21. 10 M. &W. 546 (1842).
22. Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546 (1842).
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defendant's antecedent negligence prevents him from avoiding the harm,
most courts refuse to apply the last wrongdoer theory.23
Last clear chance as a subject of criticism has provided a field day
for the legal writers.24 As a legal concept, last dear chance does leave
much to be desired. Should the last wrongdoer be considered the worst
wrongdoer and bear the entire loss merely because his negligence occurred
subsequent to that of the plaintiff? Last clear chance does mitigate the
harsh common law rule of contibutory negligence, but is -the end result
more just? The all or nothing rule of recovery at common law is harsh
on the plaintiff in many cases, but, except where defendant's negligence
is more than ordinary, last clear chance in shifting the entire loss to the
defendant is equally as harsh as the rule of contributory negligence. The
doctrine is based upon hindsight and usually involves difficult factual
determinations such as measurement of tire marks, supposition as to dis-
tances and the end result, in many instances, is simply pure speculation.
The defendant may sometimes find the entire loss shifted to him when
he was not really negligent, but simply slow in reacting or guilty of an
error in judgment.25 The application of fictional analyses based upon
proximate cause often stretches that nebulous doctrine to the breaking
point and departs from the modern theories of negligence.26
Although last clear chance has been under fire for a number of years
and has been described as a transitory doctrine,27 apparently it is more
than just a phase since it originated over 100 years ago and seems to have
gained an even stronger foothold in the law in more recent years.
THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN ADMIRALTY
In 1918 the seventh circuies ruling in The Norman B. ReamP8
seemed to have excluded last clear chance from the law of admiralty. The
court briefly stated that this rule was created to mitigate the common
law principle that contributory negligence is a bar to recovery, but the
rule did not apply in admiralty since in that field contributory negli-
gence effects only a division of damages. This decision could have settled
the question, but, although it has been frequently cited,2 9 a number of
23. For a summary of the case law see HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS,
(1956); PROSSER, TORTS 290-96 (2d ed. 1955).
24. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rnv. 3
(1927); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mlct-. L. REv. 465, 473 (1953).
25. See Smith v. Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co., 80 Conn. 268, 67 Adt. 888
(1907).
26. Green, supra note 24, at 21.
27. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938).
28. 252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918).
29. See The Sakito Maru, 41 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1941); GILMORE AND
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 20 at 404, n. 47.
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courts have either overlooked or ignored the case and have proceeded to
apply the doctrine in reaching their decisions.
In several decisions, the last dear chance rule has, in effect, been ap-
plied in holding that one vessel's fault was a "condition and not a
cause" of collision.30 This type of reasoning comes closer to the fictional
standards of causation applied under common law last dear chance than
the principle of major and minor fault, which in these cases would have
been applicable and brought the same result.
A little over twenty years after the Ream case the second circuit
found no difficulty in applying last dear chance by name in The Wa-
tupa3l and The Sanday.32  Neither case discussed the Ream case, but
appear to have simply assumed the doctrine was applicable. After these
two decisions the doctrine, by name or in principle, was accepted with
little hesitation in more than just isolated instances,33 but not without
some confusion as to how it should be applied. One line of decisions
required actual knowledge of the danger involved;3 4 i.e., a conscious last
dear chance, while other decisions held that it was sufficient if the danger
should have been discovered in the exercise of due care.3 5
There apparently has been little discussion regarding the validity of
this use of the doctrine until 1957, when a district court in Richmond v. The
Connie C. Cenac and The LaCache 6 commented that the doctrine had
been used in admiralty "largely by persons who, being unfamiliar with
the subject, would equate the navigation of slow responding vessels at
sea to the operation of quick responding vehicles on the highways."3'
30. The Syosset, 71 F.2d 666 (2d Cit. 1934); The Perserverence, 63 F.2d 788 (2d,
Cir. 1933).
31. 120 F.2d 766 (2d Cit. 1941).
32. 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cit. 1941).
33. See Kosnac v. The Norcuba 243 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1957); Crawford v. Indian
Towing Co., 240 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1957); J. S. Gissel & Co. v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc., 219 F.2d 233 (5th Cit. 1955); P. Daugherty Co. v. United States, 207 F.2d
626 (3d Cir. 1953); The Cedar Cliff, 149 F.2d 964 (2d Cit. 1945); Southern
Transp. Co. v. Dauntless Towing Line, 140 F.2d 215 (2d Cit. 1944); Pure Oil Co.
v. The F. B. Walker, 127 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. La. 1955); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
The W. C. Harnes, 134 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1954); Hertz v. Consolidated
Fisheries, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Manhattan Lighterage Corp.
v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
34. Southern Transp. Co. v. Dauntless Towing Line, 140 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. The Cedar Cliff, 149 F.2d 964 (2d Cit. 1945); The Watupa, 120 F.2d 766
(2d Cir. 1941).
36. 157 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. La. 1957).
37. Id. at 400. The court points out a lack of comprehension that is evident in
many admiralty decisions. To bring a ship to rest from full speed ahead while
making full headway, engines put at full astern power will stop the vessel in 4 to 6
ship lengths. (An average freighter is about 460 feet long; the larger passenger
vessels may exceed 1000 feet in length). TURPIN AND MAcEwEN, MERCI-NT
NOTES
The court, however, did not completely rule out the use of the principle
in all cases, but refused to apply it where the negligence of both of the
vessels involved actively continued up to the moment of collision.
Even more recently the issue was considered again and the most
cogent opinion on the entire subject was written by Justice Gilliam in
Williamson v. The Carolina.8  After reviewing the use of the doctrine
in admiralty, the court concluded that in all the cases that he had dis-
covered the major and minor fault rule could have been applied and the
same results achieved. Justice Gilliam noted that to extend the com-
mon law doctrine to the situation in which the injury is equally occa-
sioned through the negligence of both parties, although the negligence
of one occurrs subsequent in time, would to that extent do away with
the rule of divided damages. He concluded that in such circumstances
the doctrine did not apply in admiralty. 9  Prior to this decision, the
conflict with the principle of divided damages had not been discussed or
apparently even considered by the tribunals applying the last clear chance
rule. The question remains as to whether or not this well reasoned
decision will start a trend away from the use of the doctrine in admiralty.
The foregoing essentially sets out the judicial status of the rule at the
present time. The text writers have not clarified the issue to any extent.
Several of the standard American works40 make no mention of the doc-
trine. The recent treatise on admiralty law by Messrs. Gilmore and
Black neatly tosses the problem back to the reader with a brief footnote
treatment of the subject.41
The Conflict Between Last Clear Chance and Basic
Admiralty Principles
If our maritime courts were to completely accept the principles of
last clear chance, the rule of division of damages would be nullified in
any case where a court could apply the rationale that the last wrongdoer
bears the entire loss.4 2  The full extension of the doctrine would also
volved, than in the usual problem arising from the collision of two
vehicles on land. Unlike the railroad engineer or the automobile driver,
MARINE OFFIC'c~s HANDBOOK 234 (1945). This is a rule of thumb and will vary
from ship to ship, but it is a good estimate.
38. 158 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
39. Id. at 424.
40. BENEDICT, ADUMALTY (6th ed. 1940 Supp. 1958); ROBINSON, ADMIEALTY
(1939).
41. GILMORE AND BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 404, n. 47 (1957). See, however, the
discussion in GRIFFIN, AMMRICAN LAW OF COLLISION § 214-23 (1949). For
the British view see MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 26-34 (10th ed. 1953).
42. See Williamson v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417, 424 (S.D.N.C. 1958).
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negate the Rule of the Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania standard in most
cases would require at least a division of damages when a vessel breached
a statutory duty. However, when the other vessel was also at fault and
that fault was subsequent in time, the last clear chance doctrine would
place the entire loss upon the last wrongdoer, regardless of the Rule
of the Pennsylvania.
Unfortunately, the last wrongdoer concept in -its application tends to
disregard the fine line between reasonable error in judgment committed
by an individual under the stress of a suddenly imposed dangerous situa-
tion, and unreasonable conduct falling under the classification of negli-
gence. Thus, it seems entirely possible that, as a practical matter, the
doctrine of in extremis might well be lost in the wake of last clear
chance.
Possible Difficulties in Administering the Rule
There are certain aspects of the maritime field that make the applica-
tion of last clear chance a great deal more difficult when vessels are in-
in many instances the master of a vessel is not free to take independent
action until practically the very last moment. For example, when two
ships are approaching each other on courses that will intersect at right
angles, the ship having the other on her port hand (left side) is termed
the privileged vessel and must maintain her course and speed, while the
other, called the burdened vessel, must avoid crossing the privileged ves-
sel's bow and if necessary, slacken her speed, stop or reverse her engines.48
In the ordinary case the burdened vessel will alter her course to starboard
and pass under the stern of the privileged vessel. However, when the
burdened vessel does not mind her nautical manners, the master of the
privileged vessel is placed in an extremely difficult position. The Rules
of the Road require him to maintain his course and speed until the actions
of the other vessel force him into the jaws of collision.44 He cannot act
too soon and yet he may be held at fault if he hesitates a few seconds too
long.
The factual determination is complicated by such factors as wind,
current, sea effects, and the varying maneuvering characteristics of differ-
ent ships. Then, too, the plotting of navigational data (positions, courses
and speeds) is sketchy at best when vessels are being piloted through con-
gested waters. There are no skid marks to measure and it is a rare case
in which the testimony of disinterested bystanders is available to the
court.
43. Rules 19-21, International Regulations for Navigation at Sea, 65 Stat. 418
(1951), 33 U.S.C. §§ 146 (c)-(e) (1952).
44. FARWELL, RULES OF THE NAUTICAL RoAD 328 (rev. ed. 1954).
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Very few of our judges are, to any professional degree, sailors. To
complicate an already difficult task by introducing the hair splitting cal-
culations required by last dear chance would seem unwise.
CONCLUSION
After viewing the overall picture it appears that there is very little to
gain through the use of last dear chance by our admiralty courts and a
great deal to be lost
Basically, there is no foundation upon which the doctrine can rest,
since the contributory negligence rule of common law is not followed by
our maritime courts.
Apart from its origin, the doctrine as a legal tool in admiralty is not
necessary and conflicts with established maritime principles. The appli-
cation of the major and minor fault rule in instances where the plain-
tiff's negligence is considerably less than the negligence of the defendant
reaches the same result as last dear chance. However, where the injury
is occasioned by comparatively equal fault on the part of the vessels in-
volved, to apply the last wrongdoer principle is contrary to the philosophy
of divided damages. The Rule of the Pennsylvania and the doctrine of
in extremis also seem to be fundamentally in opposition to this common
law rule.
As a practical matter the actual administration of last clear chance
would make an already difficult factual determination far too complex.
It is submitted that the established admiralty tests used in determining
fault are based upon principles closer to the modern theories of negli-
gence than are the fictional concepts of proximate cause adopted by
many courts under the last dear chance doctrine. The division of dam-
ages has been described as a stepping stone, or midway point, between
the common law theories of negligence liability and true apportionment
of damages.45 It would seem to be more desirable to move towards the
more realistic apportionment of damages than to regress by incorporating
the common law doctrine of last clear chance into the admiralty field.46
HAROLD L. WITSAMAN
45. Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333,
341 (1932).
46. Quite often admiralty courts indicate a desire to apportion damages although
unable to do so under present American admiralty principles. See The Margaret, 30
F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1929). For excellent discussions of comparative fault and the
continental rule of apportionment of damages see Huger, The Proportional Damage
Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CoRNELL LQ. 531 (1928); Mole and Wilson, supra
note 45; Turk, Comparative Negligence, 28 CHI-KENT L. Rmv. 189 (1950).
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